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SELLING A BUSINESS AND STARTING ANEW:
LIQUIDATION-REINCORPORATION IN
THE SIMPLE SITUATION
by
JOHN R. DOROCAK*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The ProblemA CLIENT APPROACHES his attorney with a fairly common problem. The
client, as sole or predominant shareholder, operates a business in the
corporate form. He wishes to sell all the assets of that business to a third party.
The client will then take the proceeds of the sale, after distribution to himself
as shareholder, and use a part of them to capitalize a new corporation, which
will purchase a new business. The question for the attorney is whether this simple
transaction will ever call forth the tax doctrine of liquidation-reincorporation.
The liquidation-reincorporation doctrine is applied by the Commissioner
of the Internal Revenue Service' to convert what appears to be the liquidation
of a first (or old) corporation and the incorporation of a second (or new) cor-
poration from two separate transactions into one unified tax reorganization.
The liquidation-reincorporation doctrine, then, is a particular application of
the step-transaction doctrine, by which the Commissioner argues that several
steps should be taken together and viewed as one transaction.' The taxpayer
is, of course, hoping for treatment of the distribution from the first corpora-
tion as a distribution in liquidation, to be taxed at capital gain rates.I The Com-
missioner takes the position that the distribution is boot, i.e., cash or other
property received in a reorganization which, under proper circumstances, will
*Honors A.B. 1973, Xavier University; .. D. 1977, Case Western Reserve University; Instructor, Cuyahoga
Community College and Dyke College; formerly attorney, Office of District Counsel, Cleveland, Ohio
(representing the Internal Revenue Service); Associate, Persky, Marken, Konigsberg & Shapiro Co., L.P.A.,
Cleveland, Ohio.
'The government will be referred to variously in this article as the Commissioner, the Internal Revenue
Service, and the Service, without any particular significance for the variation.
2 T. D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134.
'I.R.C. § 331 (West 1978) (All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, unless
otherwise noted.) By liquidating a corporation and then transferring some or all of that corporation's
assets into a new corporation, there can be several favorable tax consequences. Included among these
are: (1) stepped-up basis for the assets transferred to the new corporation, allowing greater depreciation
deductions in future years. I.R.C. § 334. (2) withdrawal of earnings and profits from the transferring cor-
poration by the shareholders at capital gains rates. I.R.C. § 331. (3) elimination of earnings and profits
in the transferring corporation, thus avoiding the accumulated earnings tax under I.R.C. § 531.
[1031
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be taxed as a dividend.'
The liquidation-reincorporation doctrine, then, could have a significant
tax effect on the client's proposed transaction if the doctrine is deemed to apply.
It is tempting to say that when a taxpayer sells all the assets of a corporation
which he owns to a third party and merely uses proceeds from that sale to start
a new corporation, the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine should not be called
forth. However, in at least one often-cited case in which a taxpayer essentially
used only proceeds in starting a second corporation, the Commissioner argued
for application of the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine.5 The Commissioner
prevailed in that case at the Tax Court level, but was reversed at the Court
of Appeals. Now the Commissioner seems to have accepted that reversal when
testing for a reorganization apart from the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine.,
A question remains, however, as to when the Commissioner will again push
his argument, given slightly different facts, in the liquidation-reincorporation
context. This article will examine the likelihood of the liquidation-
reincorporation doctrine being applied to the "simple" transaction which has
been described. It is believed, contrary to initial temptations, that the doctrine
may be applied by the Service to the simple situation, particularly where the
taxpayer is involved in the same type of business in the second corporation
and undertakes that business without much of a break in the time following
the liquidation of the first corporation.
As an illustration of the problem, consider the following transaction. The
client is the sole shareholder in a corporation which operates a gas station in
'I.R.C. § 356 (West Supp. 1983). By considering a liquidation-reincorporation as a reorganization, the
Internal Revenue Service eliminates the favorable tax consequences for both the shareholders and cor-
porations. Instead of getting a stepped-up basis, the new corporation gets the same basis in the assets
transferred as the liquidating corporation had. I.R.C. § 361. Earnings and profits cannot be withdrawn
at capital gains rates and earnings and profits are accumulated and subject to the accumulated earnings
tax under I.R.C. § 531.
'Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'g 42 T.C. 510 (1964). See also, Becher
v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 932 (1954), aff'd 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955); Bentsen v. Phinney, 199 F. Supp.
363 (S.D. Tex. 1961). See T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134 for a discussion of these cases in this context.
6T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134. In explaining the basis for requiring in a reorganization the use of either
historic assets of the first corporation or the conducting of the historic business of the first corporation
by the second corporation in a new regulation, Treas. Reg. 1.368-1(d), this Treasury Decision described
Pridemark as follows:
A number of cases subsequent to Becher, including decisions of the tax court, have recognized
the principles set forth in the regulation. In Pridemark v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir.
1965), T [the acquired or first corporation] terminated its business, sold substantially all of its assets,
and distributed the proceeds and its remaining assets in liquidation. The court found that at the
time of the sale of T's assets the T shareholders did not intend to revive T's business. After several
unsuccessful investments, the T shareholders reincorporated into P [the acquiring or second cor-
poration]. Only an insignificant portion of l's assets were transferred to P. Shortly after T's liquida-
tion, P engaged in a similar line of business. The court in holding that there was a complete li-
quidation of T did not consider conduct by P of a business similar to T's as sufficient evidence
to reach a contrary result. T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134 at 136-137.
Notice that in the regulation, the Commissioner was attempting to limit the availability of a reorganiza-
tion, which is his normal position because of the tax-free consequences to taxpayers. In the liquidation-
reincorporation doctrine, the Commissioner is on the opposite side from his normal position because he
is arguing that a reorganization should be found.
[Vol. 2
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a suburb of a large city. The corporation will sell all of its assests to a third
party for $9,000x and intends an Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter referred
to as I.R.C.) § 337 liquidation.' The client will end up with about $6,000x after-
tax (assuming liquidation treatment) dollars, after liabilities are paid, upon
distribution of the proceeds to him. The gas station is being sold because it
is a large volume, multi-service one demanding constant attention, and the client
wishes no longer to furnish such attention. Assume that the station furnishes
a complete array of mechanical services, is open long hours, and contains a
substantial mini-foodmarket, as many such operations do today. The client
has under consideration for purchase a smaller gas station without the
foodmarket or complete array of mechanical services, in a suburb near
the station which he is selling. The client contemplates organizing a new cor-
poration and transferring to it $1,000x for capital stock. He will loan the cor-
poration $3,000x. The new gas station can be purchased for approximately
$6,000x. The corporation will take the proceeds from the capital stock and
loan and apply them as a down payment with the balance owed to the seller.
Notice that the proposed transaction appears to have several business purposes.
First, the gas stations are located in different areas. Secondly, the second gas
station would not be utilizing substantially all the assets as liquidated of the
first gas station. Finally, the two gas stations are two different types of
businesses.
This article will now describe the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine as
it applies to the "simple" transaction. In closing, the article will apply the
discussed principles to the example given above.
B. No Private Letter Rulings
The problem posited is assumed to be a rather common one and one which
would not economically call for the expense of obtaining a private letter ruling.
However, even if the time, expense and attracted attention of the Internal
Revenue Service in applying for a private letter ruling could be justified, the
Service will not issue a letter ruling where a liquidation is followed by a reincor-
poration and where all or part of the business and assets are transferred to
the second corporation by the first corporation or by the shareholders of the
first corporation, when more than 20% of the stock in both corporations is
owned by the same shareholders. 8
71.R.C. § 337 (a) (West Supp. 1983) provides as follows:
GENERAL RULE. - If, within the 12-month period beginning on the date on which a corporation
adopts a plan of complete liquidation, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in com-
plete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall be recognized to
such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period.
Section 337 allows for a corporation to sell its assets without recognizing a gain on the sale. This section
was enacted to change the result in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945). The cor-
poration now itself can negotiate with potential buyers and make a sale without the need for the shareholders
to liquidate the corporation before looking for a buyer for the assets. B. BITTRKER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 111.64 (4th ed. 1979).
'Rev. Proc. 83-22, 1983-1 C.B. 680, § 3.01(21)
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II. LIQUIDATION V. REORGANIZATION:
STATUTORY PROVISIONS TREATING GAIN
A. Section 331
Internal Revenue Code § 331, for which the taxpayer is reaching in the
simple situation, is rather straightforward:
(a) Distributions in complete liquidation treated as exchanges. - Amounts
received by a shareholder in a distribution in complete liquidation of a
corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock.
(b) Nonapplication of Section 301. - Section 301 (relating to the effects
on shareholder of distributions of property) shall not apply to any distribu-
tion of property other than a distribution referred to in paragraph (2)(B)
of section 316(b), in complete liquidation.9
A liquidation of the type under discussion in this article is also often done
in conformance with I.R.C. Section 337. Section 337 provides that there shall
be no gain or loss on the sale by the corporation if assests of the corporation
are distributed following the sale or exchange of property within a twelve month
period."
B.Section 356
Section 356(a), which is the Commissioner's approach in the simple situa-
tion, provides for the taxation of boot received in reorganizations. Boot is money
or the fair market value of other property received when such money or other
property is received in an exchange to which sections 354 or 355 would apply
but for the fact that, in addition to property permitted to be received in the
reorganization, such boot is received. If the distribution has the effect of a
dividend, then each distributee is treated as receiving a dividend to the extent
of his proportionate share of the gain and his proportionate share of earnings
and profits. The remainder of any gain is treated as a gain from the exchange
of property.II Note that the dividend is only to the extent of the gain. This
is often called the "dividend within gain." At one time, the Internal Revenue
*I.R.C. §331 (West 1978). I.R.C. 316(b) (West 1978), refers to certain insurance company dividends and
distributions by personal holding companies.
'Id. § 337 (West Supp. 1983).
"I.R.C. § 356 (West Supp. 1983). Section 356(a) provides as follows:
GAIN ON EXCHANGES. -
(1)RECOGNITION OF GAIN. - If -
(A) section 354 or 355 would apply to an exchange but for the fact that
(B) the property received in the exchange consists not only of property permitted by sec-
tion 354 or 355 to be received without the recognition of gain but also of other property or money,
then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of the
sum of such money and the fair market value of such other property.
(2) TREATMENT As DIVIDEND. - If an exchange is described in paragraph (1) but has the ef-
fect of the distribution of a dividend (determined with the application of section 318 (a)), then
there shall be treated as a dividend to each distributee such an amount of the gain recognized under
paragraph (1) as is not in excess of his ratable share of the undistributed earnings and profits of
the corporation accumulated after February 28, 1913. The remainder, if any, of the gain recogniz-
ed under paragraph (1) shall be treated as gain from the exchange of property.
[Vol, 2
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Service believed that all boot was automatically a dividend, but it has since
indicated that the tests of section 302(b)(1) are essentially used to determine
whether the distribution is essentially equivalent to a dividend.' 2
Therefore, in the "simple" situation, if I.R.C. § 356 is deemed to apply,
there is a possibility of dividend treatment for the distribution, to the extent
of gain. The Service will argue that I.R.C. § 356 applies because of the
liquidation-reincorporation doctrine in appropriate cases.' 3 Since the shareholder
in the "simple" situation will often have a low basis, the gain and resulting
dividend can be great. Furthermore, since the distribution is often made pro
rata in the "simple" situation, a dividend will often be found.
III. NECESSITY OF A STATUTORY REORGANIZATION
IN A LIQUIDATION-REINCORPORATION
The great weight of case authority is that for the liquidation-reincorporation
doctrine to be applied, there must be a reorganization by statute, i.e., I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(1). " However, even if a reorganization meets one of the statutory tests
of section 368(a)(1), it must also meet the tests of business continuity and con-
tinuity of interest imposed by the regulations, Treasury Regulation 1.368-1(b). I5
The statutory reorganization often involved in the situation under discussion
is a D reorganization.' 6 A D reorganization requires a transfer by a corpora-
tion of all or part of its assest to another corporation if, immediately after the
transfer, the transferor is in control of the corporation to which the assets are
transferred, provided that the stock or securities of the corporation to which
the assests are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies under
section 354, 355 or 356. " Section 354, which is usually involved, requires that
substantially all the assets of the transferor corporation be transferred. This
"substantially all" test is really a limited codification of the business continui-
"Rev. Rul. 74-515, 1974-2 C.B. 118; Rev. Rul. 74-516, 1974-2 C.B. 121; [1984] 4 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 12522.12.
"See Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 C.B. 62; See also 335 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-I1.
"Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); 335 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-28; contra, Telephone
Answering Service Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 (1974), aff'd in unpub. opin. (4th Cir. 1976),
cert den'd 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
"Even if a court were to accept that a liquidation-reincorporation can be found without a statutory
reorganization being present, presumably, still necessary are business continuity and continuity of interest
in order to have a reorganization. These requirements, as viewed by the Service, go beyond the statute
and are contained in case law. T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134. See 417 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-27 to A-29.
"I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(D) (West 1978).
"I.R.C. § 368 (a)(l)(D) (West 1978), which provides:
(D) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if immediately
after the transfer the transferor, or one or more of its shareholder (including persons who were
shareholders immediately before the transfer), or any combinationIthereof, is in control of the cor-
poration to which the assets are transferred; but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities
of the corporation to which the assets are transferred are distributed in a transaction which qualifies
under section 354, 355 or 356.
Although the requirements of a D reorganization may not literally be met in a liquidation-reincorporation
(e.g., no transfer of assets from one corporation to another where the first corporation is liquidated before
the incorporation of the second), the Courts have treated the requirements as met under step-transaction
principles.
5
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ty test.'" Often, the best approach in analyzing a liquidation-reincorporation
is to determine whether there was any business continuity, because if the con-
tinuity test is not met then it is unnecessary to consider other question.' 9
IV. THE BUSINESS CONTINUITY TEST:
HISTORIC BUSINESS OR HISTORIC ASSETS
A Contrary Indications
Where all the assets of a corporation are sold to a third party and only
the resulting funds are used in establishing a new corporation, it is quite tempt-
ing to say that there is no business continuity between the first and second cor-
porations so that there is no reorganization and, therefore, no liquidation-
reincorporation. In 1980, the Internal Revenue Sevice revised the business con-
tinuity regulation.20 The regulations now require that the second corporation
be engaged in the historic business of the first corporation or use the historic
assests of the first corporation for a reorganization to be found.2' None of
the examples in the regulations,22 however, extends to or covers mere use of
proceeds without transfer of assets.
In explaining the revision to the business continuity regulation, Treasury
Decision 7745, stated:
If the shareholders' link to T's [the acquired or first corporation's] business
or its assets is-broken by, for example, a sale of T's business to an unrelated
party as part of an overall plan of a reorganization, the interest received
in P [the acquiring or second corporation] is no different than the interest
in any corporation. An exchange of stock without a link to the underly-
ing business or business assets resembles any stock-for-stock exchange and,
as such, is a taxable event. Thus it is not enough that the shareholder's
investment remains in corporate solution.23
Similarly, in Workman v. Commissioner,2 4 the Court stated:
[W]e hold that the mere fact that the proceeds of the sale of the operating
assests of a corporation in a section 337 transaction find their way into
a new corporation owned by the same shareholders is insufficient to deprive
the old corporation of the benefits of that section.25
"Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894, 899 (5th Cir. 1981).
'
tMitchell v. United States, 451 F.2d 1395, 1397 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
"Treas. Reg. 1.368-1(b) now refers to Treas. Reg. 1.368-1(d) and the latter was added in 1980.
2
"Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(2) (1980).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(5) (1980).
23T. D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134 at 135.
'
4Workman v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 1528 (1977). There is, as assumed in this case, some
authority to indicate a liquidation and a reorganization are mutually exclusive transactions. 335 TAx MGMT.
(BNA) A-28 at n.147 citing Wilson v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 334 (1966).
"Workman, 46 T.C.M. (P-H) 1528, 1534 (1977).
[Vol. 2
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The Workman case was incorporated into the 1980 revision of the regula-
tions, which added example (3) to Treas. Reg. 1.368-1(d).16
B. Prior Case Law
Despite the strength of the above-quoted language, the Commissioner has
argued that the use of little more than proceeds alone of a liquidated corpora-
tion in a second corporation calls for the application of the liquidation-
reincorporation doctrine. In the case of Becher v. Commissioner,"' the liquidated
corporation had been in the canvas supply business and the second corpora-
tion was in the upholstery business." The Court, accepting the Commissioner's
argument, found it sufficient that the second corporation was engaged in some
business. In Becher, the business of the first corporation was wiped out by
the termination of the war.29 A majority of the stockholders decided to enter
the upholstered furniture business.3" Instead of distributing all the assets of
the corporation, $149,000 was distributed to stockholders, $166,317.24 net was
transferred to the new corporation, and $482,585.25 was retained by the old
corporation to meet outstanding liabilities. 3' The assests which were transferred
to the new corporation were merely transferred to effect their liquidation.32
However, because of the inability to sell a building, it was subsequently re-
tained by the second corporation and renovated for use in the business of the
second corporation." The stockholders, the Court found, saw no reason for
distributing the money to themselves and then transferring it to the second cor-
poration, so a direct transfer took place. 4 The Becher case appears to be the
26Example (3) provides:
Tis a manufacturer of boys' and mens' trousers. On January 1, 1978, as part of a plan of reorganiza-
tion, T sold all of its assets to a third party for cash and purchased a highly diversified portfolio
of stocks and bonds. As part of the plan, T operates an investment business until July 1, 1981.
On that date, the plan of reorganization culminates in a transfer by T of all of its assets to P, a
regulated investment company, solely in exchange for P voting stock. The continuity of business
enterprise requirement is not met. 's investment activity is not its historic business, and the stocks
and bonds are not I's historic business assets.
Treas. Reg. 1.368-1(a), T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134.
"Becher, 22 T.C. 932 (1954), aff'd, 221 F.2d 252 (2nd Cir. 1955).
2522 T.C. at 941.
"Id. at 934.
11Id. at 935.
"Id. at 936-38.
"The usual position is that the transfer of assets to a corporation merely for their liquidation will not
give rise to a reorganization. Treasury Decision 7745 asserts:
The courts have agreed that P [the acquiring corporation] must not be formed merely to dispose
of T's [the acquired corporation] assets. See, e.g., Standard Realization Company v. Commissioner,
10 T.C. 708 (1948), acq. 1948-2 C.B. 3; Graham v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 623 (1938), acq.
1938-2 C.B. 13; see also, Mitchell v. United States, 451 F.2d 1395 (Ct. Cl. 1971); T.D. 7745, 1981-1
C.B. 134 at 136.
322 T.C. at 935
141d. at 937.
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extreme example. The Internal Revenue Service now rejects it and indicates
that it has limited support.35
In Treasury Decision 7745,36 where the Internal Revenue Service rejected
the Becher case, the Commissioner was arguing to limit reorganizations in order
to limit taxpayers' qualification for tax-free treatment. In Becher, the Com-
missioner was arguing for a reorganization in order to impose dividend treat-
ment on a distribution. Notice that the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine
involves a reversal of the ordinary positions of the Commissioner and the tax-
payer as to whether a reorganization is present. Although the position of the
parties can change depending on the case, the principles that are used to deter-
mine whether a reorganization is present appear to be fairly consistent whether
the Commissioner is arguing for or against a reorganization in a particular case."
Although the Becher case does not appear to be the current position of
the Commissioner, the Commissioner has argued more recently for the
liquidation-reincorporation doctrine in a case involving little more than the use
of proceeds in the second corporation where the second corporation was engaged
in the same type of business as the first corporation.3" In Pridemark, Inc. v.
Commissioner, the first corporation, which was engaged in the business of selling
prefabricated homes, sold nearly all its assets (customer contracts on which
no deliveries had been made, leases on branch offices, customer lists and good
will) to a third party. " The corporation retained its headquarters, office and
"Treasury Decision 7745 states:
Although Becher supports the contention made in the [taxpayers'] comments, there is substantial
authority supporting the premise of the regulation that a transaction is not a tax-free reorganiza-
tion if there is no continuing nexus between the shareholders and their former business or
assets . ..
T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134 at 135-136.
"T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134.
11335 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-9 at n.48 and accompanying text. See Bentsen v. Phinney, 199 F. Supp. 363
(S.D. Tex. 1961). Treasury Decision 7745 in indicating Bentsen's support of Becher states, "However,
only one other case - Bentsen v. Phinney, supra, a 1961 District Court decision - has held that con-
tinuity of business enterprise may be satisfied merely by the use by P of proceeds of the sale of T's assets
in a business." T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134 at 136. Bentsen involved a Texas family which was arguing
for a reorganization when its three land development companies transferred real estate to its insurance
company, apparently for liquidation and use of the proceeds. The Commissioner argued that the business
of the second corporation had to be "the same identical or similar business" to the business of the first
corporation. The Commissioner, thus, was in his normal stance of arguing against a reorganization; he
was not arguing for a liquidation-reincorporation. The Court stated:
The Government has been unable to present the Court with any decision in which the meaning
of "continuity of business enterprise" as used in the Treasury Regulations, has been interpreted.
... [I]t is the province of the Court to decide whether the Treasury Regulation means what The
Government contends it means .... The Court finds that "continuity of business enterprise" as
used in the Regulation, does not mean that the new corporation must engage in either the same
type of business as the old or a similar business . . . . All that is required is that there must be
continuity of business activity. 190 F. Supp 367 at 366-367 (1961).
The Commissioner's position in Bentsen is now contained in the historical business requirement of the
expanded business continuity regulation. Treas. Reg. 1.368-1(d), T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134.
"Pridemark, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), rev'g 42 T.C. 510 (1964). There were actually three old corpora-
tions in Pridemark which sold their assets to the third party; however, the facts have been stated more
simply in the text.
11345 F.2d at 37.
[Vol. 2
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corporate name because the purchaser did not think that they were worth
purchasing.4 The liquidation took place in February, 1958.4 ' The manufac-
turer for whom the corporation had been a representative bought out the
corporation. 42 The chief stockholder-officer cited decreasing sales and advan-
cing age as reasons for selling out. 43 The purchaser hired all of the selling cor-
poration's salesmen, and the selling corporation promised not to rehire any
of these employees until a year had passed. 4 The purchaser carried on the pur-
chased business without interruption. 4 In February, 1959, the second corpora-
tion entered into a dealership arrangement with another manufacturer of
prefabricated homes." Cash in the amount of $351,000 received by the
shareholders of the first corporation was transferred to the second corporation. 47
The retained assets of the lease on the office and the name of the corporation
were also transferred to the second corporation."' The accountant, the son of
the chief stockholder, the chief stockholder, and an office worker of the old
corporation went to work for the new corporation.49 Eventually, four of the
ten salesmen of the old corporation came to work for the new corporation.50
The chief stockholder owned 80% of the old corporation and 61% of the new
corporation.II However, he worked in a purely advisory capacity in the second
corporation."
The Tax Court accepted the Commissioner's argument in Pridemark that
a liquidation-reincorporation had taken place.53 However, the Circuit Court
reversed.54 The Appeals Court found persuasive the following: The principals
stopped selling prefabricated homes for a year," every asset was offered to
the purchasing corporation, 6 all the salesmen of the old corporation went to
work for the purchasing corporation," the purchasing corporation continued
the business of the old corporation without interruption, the gross receipts of
the old corporation were nearly six times as great as those of the new corpora-
"Id.
4Id.
"21d.
"Id.at 38.
"Id.at 39.
"Id.
WId.
.7Id
4Id.
"Id.
5d.
:,Id.
31d.
"42 T.C. at 527.
"345 F.2d at 45.
"Id. at 41.
"Id. at 41-42.
"Id. at 42.
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tion, the controlling force of the old corporation worked only in an advisory
capacity in the new corporation, and only a negligible portion of the assets
of the old corporation were transferred to the new corporation. 8 Again, the
Internal Revenue Service appears to have reversed its position and now ap-
pears to accept the Pridemark holding on appeal.5 9
The Internal Revenue Service won the Becher case, but now seems to have
abandoned it. The Service lost the Pridemark case on appeal and seems now
to accept that fact. The question remains, when will the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice pursue the argument that the use of proceeds in a second corporation is
sufficient to call forth the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine? Because of the
emphasis that either historic assets or historic business is a necessity in
the business continuity regulation" as recently adopted and in the Service's
explanation of that regulation, 6 it appears unlikely-that, where only proceeds
are transferred to the second corporation, the Service will argue for a liquidation-
reincorporation, unless the second corporation is in the historic business of
the first corporation. If the second corporation is in the historic business of
the first corporation, then the key factor may be the break in time between
the liquidation of the first corporation and the incorporation of the second
corporation. That break in time, of course, was present in Pridemark and stress-
ed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The best advice an attorney might give a client,
then, could be that he ought to wait before putting the proceeds into a second
corporation if that second corporation will conduct a business similar to that
of the first corporation.
A geographic factor may also be sufficient to prevent the imposition of
"Id.
"See note 6, supra.
"Treas. Reg. 1.368-1(b), (d), T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134.
6T. D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134. The Tax Court's most recent extensive treatment of the business continuity
requirement emphasized only that some business need be carried on by the second corporation and placed
reliance on Becher. Atlas Tool Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 86 (1978) aff'd, 614 F.2d 860 (3rd
Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit in affirming the Tax Court was more cautious, stating that the new corpora-
tion had to carry forward the business of the old corporation and citing Becher only for the proposition
that the continuing business need not be identical. Treasury Decision 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134 explains Atlas
Tool as standing for the historic assets prong of the test in the regulation, i.e., the second corporation
must at least use the assets of the first corporation, although not necessarily in substantially the same business.
The Tax Court may have immediately modulated its approach after Atlas Tool. In Laure v. Commis-
sioner, 70 T.C. 1087 (1978), the Court, citing Becher, stated only, "This does not mean that the continu-
ing business must be the same as that conducted by the transferor .... On the other hand, if the transferor's
business is not continued, there must be some use of the transferor's assets in the transferee's business."
70 T.C. at 1103.
"
2Pridemark, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), at n.6 and accompanying text. This is the interpretation that
appears to have been given to Pridemark by at least some of the courts. Atlas Tool Co., Inc., 614 F.2d
860 (3rd Cir. 1980) aff'g 70 T.C. 86 (1978) at n.10 However, T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134 explained that,
under step transaction principles, a break in time might still not defeat a reorganization. The Treasury
Decision was discussing example (3) of Treas. Reg. 1.368-1(d), T.D. 7745, 1981-1 C.B. 134. See note 26,
supra.
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the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine. In Mitchell v. United States," even
though the second corporation had acquired some assets of the first corpora-
tion besides merely proceeds and conducted the historic business of the first
corporation, the Court held that no reorganization was present because an en-
tirely separate business was conducted in a different location."' The Commis-
sioner had argued for liquidation-reincorporation, but the Court of Claims re-
jected the argument."5 The first corporation was unable to qualify to do business
in Australia, although it had done substantial business in Libya. 6 Therefore,
it organized a second corporation.67 The second corporation was owned by
the same shareholders as the first in the same respective percentages.6 The first
corporation had done some preliminary work in Australia.69 It transferred to
the second corporation a contract which it had obtained in Australia and equip-
ment and a relatively small number of employees which it had sent there.7"
However, there was no thought at this time of liquidating the first corporation.7'
Subsequently, the first corporation liquidated because business turned sour in
Libya.7" All the assets of the first corporation were then sold to the second
corporation so that the first corporation could dissolve as quickly as possible
and so that the assets were out of the first corporation's name because of possible
seizure by the Libyans. 3 It was contemplated that the second corporation would
liquidate the assets of the first corporation' (a situation similar to that in
Becher). Two minor transactions were engaged in by the second corporation
in Libya.7" The Court held that the business of the second corporation was
its own and it had not engaged in the business of the first corporation.76
Therefore, there was no continuity of business and the first corporation was
completely liquidated so that no liquidation-reincorporation could be found.
Reliance on Mitchell might call for the developing of relevant geographic markets
in arguing against the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine.
6'Mitchell, 451 F.2d 1395 (Ct. Cl. 1971). The Tax Court has indicated that it reads the holding in this
case as there was a complete liquidation so no decision is necessary on whether there was a reorganiza-
tion. Altas Tool Co., Inc., 70 T.C. 86 at n.10 (1978) aff'd 614 F.2d 860 (3rd Cir. 1980). However, that
reading ignores the language of the case which is that, although it is not necessary to consider which statutory
reorganization provision is met, a reorganization is not present if the business continuity requirement of
the regulations is not satisfied.
"Mitchell, 451 F.2d at 1400.
6,Id.
"Id. at 1398.
"7Id.
6&id.
69/d
.
"Id
.
7'Id.
7Id. at 1399.
73Id.
"Id. at 1400.
"Id.
761d.
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The business continuity doctrine, as mentioned above,77 is codified, to some
extent, in the "substantially-all-the-assets" test. Many of the cases in the
liquidation-reincorporation area turn on the percentage of assets transferred
to the second corporation. The courts emphasize that no fixed percentage of
assets is required as long as the essential assets are transferred. In service cor-
porations, often it is the personnel which constitute the essential assets; if essen-
tial assets are transferred, a liquidation-reincorporation will be found.78 The
Pridemark case did not turn on this test because the Court there relied on the
provisions of an F reorganization rather than a D reorganization for which
the "substantially-all-the-assets" test applies. 9 The Becher Court found that
a transfer of 25076 of assets, although essentially to be liquidated, satisfied a
"substantially-all-the-assets" test. However, that Court raised the test with
regard to 1939 Internal Revenue Code Section 112(g)(1)(C), but held a reorganiza-
tion was present under Section 112(g)(l)(D). A 1939 Code C reorganization mir-
rors the language of a C reorganization under the 1954 Code; a 1939 Code
D reorganization is similar to 1954 Code D reorganization, except that the
"substantially-all-the-assets" test was not under the old Code required in D
reorganizations. 80
In attempting to determine whether the Commissioner will argue for the
liquidation-reincorporation doctrine in a given case where merely sale proceeds
are used in a second corporation, it appears best to weigh the various facts
and circumstances which have appeared in the cases. From Pridemark and Mit-
chell, the following factors appear important: a break in time between the
liquidation of the first corporation and the starting up of the second corpora-
tion; a sale of all or nearly all the assets to a third party; lack of involvement
by employees, including the chief employee, of the first corporation in the sec-
ond corporation; the third party continuing the business of the first corpora-
tion uninterrupted; the gross receipts of the second corporation much smaller
"See note 19 and accompanying text, supra.
"Smothers, 642 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1981) (15% of net value transferred to second corporation, but all
employees, and the business continued uninterrupted); Moffatt v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 558 (1964) aff'd
363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966) cert. den'd 386 U.S. 1016 (1967) (65% of assets transferred to second cor-
poration with staff of trained personnel). See 335 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-8.
"Pridemark, 42 T.C. 510 (1964) rev'd 345 F.2d (4th Cir. 1965); See 335 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-14 thru
17; see also note 81 et seq., infra, and accompanying text.
'Ilnt. Rev. Code of 1939, Ch. 1, § 112 (g)(l) provided as follows:
(1) The term 'reorganization' means (A) a statutory merger or consolidation, or (B) the acquistion
by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock, of at least 80 per centum
of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number of shares of all other classes
of stock of another corporation, or (C) the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for
all or a part of its voting stock, of substantially all the properties of another corporation, but in
determining whether the exchange is solely for voting stock the assumption by the acquiring cor-
poration of a liability of the other, or the fact that property acquired is subject to a liability, shall
be disregarded, or (D) a transfer by q corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corpora-
tion if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its shareholders or both are in control of
the corporation to which the assets are transferrcd, or (E) a recapitalization, or (F) a mere change
in identity, form, or place of organization, however effected.
I.R.C. § 354(b)(l)(A) (West 1978), which imposes the substantially-all-the-assets test in a D reorganiza-
tion, was new in the 1954 Code and had no predecessor in the law.
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than those of the first corporation; use of none or very few assets of the first
corporation in the second corporation, other than proceeds; and conducting
of the business of the second corporation in a different location from that of
the first corporation. All of the factors, when considered, bear on the con-
tinuity of the business.
V. WHICH STATUTORY REORGANIZATION
PROVISION, IF ANY
If indeed the various facts and circumstances indicate a continuity of
business between the first and second corporations, it is now appropriate to
analyze which statutory form of a reorganization is present, given the above-
mentioned requirement of a statutory reorganization for a liquidation-
reincorporation.' Often, the Commissioner will argue for a D reorganization
in a liquidation-reincorporation; but, the Section 368(c) definition of control
as 80% of the ownership in the second corporation has caused the Commis-
sioner to raise other arguments.8 2 In fact, the Commissioner has also argued
that a liquidation-reincorporation could be an F reorganization. 3 The Commis-
sioner subsequently tried to abandon his F reorganization argument, apparently
aware of its implications when he was on the other side of the reorganization
question, ' but eventually again reversed and accepted that an F reorganiza-
tion could involve two corporations in limited circumstances.8 5 The Tax Equi-
ty and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA") once again reversed the
Commissioner's position. The Act amended section 368(a)(l)(F) to apply to a
"a mere change in identity, form, or place of organization of one corporation. ,,86
The Commissioner has also argued, and the Tax Court has accepted, that, con-
trary to the weight of case authority, a statutory reorganization need not be
present in a liquidation-reincorporation, but merely a failure to make a "com-
plete liquidation" as required by Section 331.18
"See note 14, supra, and accompanying text.
"1335 TAX MGMT. (BNA), particularly at A-9 et seq. The most common argument made by the Commis-
sioner is for a D reorganization. See Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); Commissioner v.
Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966); Drummond v. Commissioner, 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9608.
But the Commissioner has not limited these arguments to D reorganizations alone. The Commissioner
has also argued for a F reorganization. See Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966); Reef
Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966); Atlas Tool Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d
860 (5th Cir. 1980). Additionally, the Commissioner has argued that liquidation-reincorporation should
not be accorded favorable tax treatment since they are "sham" transactions. See Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2
C.B. 62. See also Telephone Answering Service Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 (1974); aff'd
in unpub. opin. (4th Or. 1976), cert den'd431 U.S. 914 (1977); Pridemark Inc., 42 T.C. 510 (1964) rev'd
345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965); Mitchell v. United States, 45 F.2d 1395 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
"See note 79, supra and accompanying text; e.g., Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966)
aff'g in part and rev'g in part 43 T.C. 540 (1965).
14335 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-16; Rev. Rul. 69-185, 1969-1 C.B. 108.
"Rev. Rul. 75-561, 1975-2 C.B. 129.
"Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 225 (1982) (emphasis added).
"Telephone Answering Service Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 423 (1974), aff'din unpub. opin. (4th
Cir. 1976), cert. den'd 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (hereafter referred to as TASCO). 335 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-27
thru 32 describes this case as follows:
In TASCO, The corporation directly operated a telephone answering service business located in
13
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In the "simple" situation, the Commissioner may be hard-pressed to win
an argument for a D reorganization because of the substantially-all-the-assets
test if only proceeds are transferred to the second corporation. Since TEFRA
would foreclose an F reorganization argument, the Commissioner may press
in the future the position of no complete liquidation. The business continuity
test discussed above would also be relevant to that position because, if there
is continuity, there is less likely to be a complete liquidation.8
VI. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES TO THE PROBLEM
An application of the above-summarized factors concerning business con-
tinuity to the gas station example posited above suggests the following. Little
break in time was suggested between the liquidation of the first corporation
and the incorporation of the second corporation. This would appear to the
usual situation when a client such as the hypothetical one approaches the
attorney. However, a break in time may be one of the most persuasive factors
against application of the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine.89 Futhermore,
in the gas station hypothetical, the third party was to buy all the assets of the
first corporation. The language in the Treasury Decision concerning the business
continuity regulation amendment strongly suggests that such a sale can cut off
Baltimore, Maryland, and also owned all of the stock of two subsidiaries: Houston, which operated
an answering service in Texas, and North American, which operated an answering service in several
cities, including Chicago. The taxpayer adopted a plan of liquidation, sold all of the Houston stock
to an unrelated person, transferred its directly operated business to New TASCO, a newly organized
corporation, for all of its stock, and then, within 12 months after the adoption of the plan, distributed
to its shareholders all of its assets, consisting of the stock of North American and New TASCO
and the cash received on the sale of Houston. The taxpayer realized substantial gain on the sale
of the Houston stock, and the issue in TASCO was whether § 337 applied to prevent the inclusion
of that gain in its taxable income.
The Commissioner contended that the transfer of property to New TASCO in exchange for
stock, followed by distribution of all assets to shareholders was a D reorganization. If upheld, this
contention would provide ground for arguing that § 337 does not apply to the sale of the Houston
stock because there is authority to the effect that a liquidation and a reorganization are mutually
exclusive transactions. [E.g., Wilson v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 334 (1966).]
The majority opinion in TASCO did not explore these matters [involving the D reorganiza-
tion question]. Instead, ignoring the D reorganization argument made by the Commissioner, it found
the sale of Houston stock to be taxable on an entirely different ground. Specifically, the majority
focused on the requirement in § 337 that all assets "be distributed in complete liquidation" within
12 months after the adoption of a plan of liquidation. The Court stated this language in § 337:
"... evidences an intent to require a bona fide elimination of the corporate entity and does
not include a transaction in which substantially the same shareholders continue to utilize a substan-
tial part of the directly owned assets of the same enterprise in uninterrupted corporate form."
Since the "directly owned" business of the taxpayer continued in corporate solution owned entire-
ly by shareholders of the taxpayer, the majority held there to be no complete liquidation, so that
§ 337 was inapplicable. (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at A-28, 29.
"Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 420, 449 (1970) (Tannewald, J. dissenting); See also TASCO,
63 T.C. 423, 433 (1974); 335 TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-27.
"See note 62, supra, and accompanying text.
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the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine.9 Employees, particularly the key
employee, of the first corporation will often come over to the second corpora-
tion, as in the gas station hypothetical. This, indeed, may be a problem, par-
ticularly where services are an essential part of the business." If the third party
really does continue the business of the first corporation, the courts seem to
regard that as precluding the second corporation from conducting the business
of the first corporation.9" Where gross receipts of the second corporation are
much smaller than those of the first corporation, as would be the case in the
gas station hypothetical, evidence is present that the second corporation is not
conducting the business of the first corporation, or at least not all of it.93
Conducting the business of the second corporation in a different location from
that of the first corporation, as suggested in the gas station hypothetical, would
appear to be persuasive evidence that the second corporation is not conducting
the business of the first corporation.9 '
In many of the cases, the taxpayer arguing that the liquidation is indeed
a true liquidation points to business reasons for the liquidation. But the cases
are uniform in stating that a business reason for the liquidation, rather than
a tax avoidance purpose, is not controlling. The business continuity test is what
is controlling.95
In the gas station hypothetical, it would appear that, if the client locates
the second corporation in a different area, conducts a different business, and
generates presumably smaller gross receipts, and if the third-party purchaser
continues the business of the first corporation (after having purchased all the
assets of the first corporation), then there is sufficient evidence to prevent the
:'See note 23, supra, and accompanying text.
'See notes 38, 78, supra, and accompanying text.
"In Pridemark, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), the Appeals Court stated, "The business built up by Eugene
Blitz was thereafter carried on by Golden Key without interruption .... The new corporation cannot
fairly be considered a continuation of the old business when in fact it has been continued, without inter-
ruption, by Golden Key." Id. at 81 and 84. See, Mitchell, 451 F. 2d 1395, 1400 (Ct. Cl. 1971), where
the Court stated, "Rather, the business that McCollum engaged in after Namco's dissolution was
McCollum's own business."
"Pridemark, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965), where the Court stated: "The gross receipts of the old corpora-
tion in its last year of operation were $1,791,266.00. In its first year of operation the new corporation
grossed less than $300,000.00, indicating plainly enough that a new business was being built up." Id. at
42. Compare the partial liquidation contraction of business doctrine under I.R.C. § 346. B. BITTKER &
J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 9.52. (4th ed. 1979). See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-240, 1959-2 C.B. 112.
'See note 63, supra, and accompanying text.
"In Atlas Tool, Inc., 614 F.2d 860 (3rd Cir. 1980), aff'g 70 T.C. 86 (1978), the Court stated:
There is no disagreement among the parties that a business purpose is required for a reorganiza-
tion.... However, the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine is aimed at recharacterizing a liquida-
tion in light of the entire transaction, notwithstanding liquidation motives. Thus, the liquidation
purpose alone, and therefore the inference of a non-tax avoidance motive from it, cannot by definition
be dispositive, and certainly does not prevent the characterization of the transaction as a D reorganiza-
tion... The focus of the non-statutory test is not, therefore, whether there were tax avoidance
motives, but whether objectively there was continuity of business rather than termination of
business .... What is critical is whether the new corporation carries forward the business of the
old. (Footnotes omitted.) Id. at 866.
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imposition of the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine. If the second gas station
was located across the street from the first and offered the same services, except
for a different oil company, it would appear likely that the Service could strongly
argue for a liquidation-reincorporation based on the above factors. A closer
case would be presented if the second gas station was located across the street
but was a self-serve only station.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although there is some rather strong language in both a Treasury Deci-
sion and some of the cases, that the mere use of proceeds from the liquidation
of one corporation in the incorporation of another will not call forth the
liquidation-reincorporation doctrine, the Internal Revenue Service has attempted
to apply the doctrine in that type of situation in some cases. Whether the prac-
ticing attorney will face the doctrine in a situation which, at first blush, does
not appear to call for the application of the doctrine may well depend on
weighing several factors which have been outlined above and which indicate
whether or not there is a business continuity between the first liquidating cor-
poration and the second incorporating corporation. Because of the Service's
policy of not granting letter rulings in these situations, the attorney is left to
weigh these factors in making his tax-planning decisions. One rather safe course,
although perhaps not practical in light of the fact that many clients will wish
to be conducting some business, would be the advice to create some break in
time between the liquidation of the first corporation and incorporation of the
second corporation. Otherwise, locating the second corporation outside of the
geographical market area of 'the first corporation may provide some safety.
Where the client wishes to continue conducting business without a break in
the same geographical area, all the attorney can do is point out the risk that
such conduct will convert capital gain into ordinary income.
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